The Engagement at Hormigueros

The ensuing account of our fight with the Alphonso XIII Regiment of Cazadores, on the 10th of August, is taken bodily from the official report made by General Schwan to Major-General Miles under date of August 21:

At a distance of about seven miles from Mayaguez the Rio Rosario, coming from the east, parallels the road for nearly a mile, and empties into the Rio Grande just south of Hormigueros. A sugar-mill stands just off the road to the left; and a wagon-road branches off to the right, lined with hedge and brush, and, crossing the Rosario on an iron bridge, leads to the hamlet of Hormigueros, which is located on a side hill 1,500 yards from the main road. The ground to the south of Hormigueros is covered with banana groves and cane fields. At about 600 yards from where the Hormigueros road leaves the main road the latter crosses the Rio Grande on a wooden bridge. Just beyond this bridge the road to Cabo Rojo branches off to the south. From this point, for nearly a mile, the main road passes through very low, flat ground, cut up with deep furrows, which extend to the hills on the left and the river on the right, and contain considerable water from recent rains.... To resume the narrative of the day’s events, near a point on the main road where it is flanked by sugar-mills our cavalry was fired into, though without effect, by the enemy’s scouts, who were concealed behind a hedge lining the Hormigueros road. They were easily dispersed. The infantry and advance-guard having passed this point, the cavalry took the latter road, and, crossing the Rosario, turned westward, and advanced under cover of the railroad embankment until taking every opportunity to damage the enemy by its fire action it reached a position beyond the covered wooden bridge.

The brigade commander had left San German at the head of the main body. When he heard the firing in his front, he sent word to commanding officers to advance without further halt, and to keep their commands closed up. Similar orders were sent to the train. He was informed and approved of the route taken by the cavalry before reaching the bridge. He crossed the latter about half-past three o’clock, being at that time about 500 yards in advance of the main body.

A staff officer, who had been sent ahead to select camp, reported at this time the ground west of the Cabo Rojo road as suitable for this purpose; but owing to the suspected proximity of the enemy, whose position had not yet been determined, it was decided to push ahead and beyond the iron bridge. This, despite the fact that the men had now marched 13 miles and were very tired. Once in possession of the bridge and the high ground to the north of it, the command would occupy a strong position, which would make it hard to check its advance on Mayaguez. Accordingly, the advance-guard, under Captain Hoyt, moved forward, deploying its advance party as skirmishers and its supports into a line of squads. In this formation it continued until it had approached the bridge within about 400 yards. At this juncture the enemy opened fire, at first individual fire. The firing aimed at the advance-guard accelerated the march of the Eleventh Infantry, which ... reported to the brigade commander, whose staff had already commenced the demolition of the wire fences enclosing the road. About the time that the brigade commander caused the deployment of two companies to re-enforce the advance-guard, Major Gilbraith in command, the enemy, from his position in the hills to the right front, fired volleys at the main body through the interval separating the infantry advance-guard from the cavalry, wounding a number of men, also an officer and several horses of the brigade staff. Meanwhile the artillery battalion, under the authority of the brigade commander, had taken up a position to the left of the road. As the powder used by the enemy was absolutely smokeless, and his position being, moreover, for the most part screened by the trees along the Rio Grande, the question of the exact direction to be given Major Gilbraith’s detachment, and to the lines of battle about to be formed from the main column, became a most perplexing one. Luckily, this uncertainty did not last long, those of the enemy’s bullets that struck the ground near us solving the problem. Some slight confusion was caused by a premature and hurried deployment of the remaining companies, which interfered somewhat with the brigade commander’s intention of forming two additional lines, one to support the fighting line and the other to act as a reserve, or as the changing conditions of the combat might render expedient. But under his supervision this defective formation was soon rectified, three companies being placed on the right and four companies on the left of the road, the former, under Lieutenant-Colonel Burke, moving forward in support of Major Gilbraith, and the latter being held back for a time. Major Gilbraith and Colonel Burke’s troops, being unable to cross the creek, passed over the bridge that spans it by the left flank, the former’s companies having previously occupied a sheltered place in a ditch parallel to and to the right of the main road. About this time the advance-guard, one of the companies of which (Penrose’s) had previously held for a short time a knoll on the left of the road, moved forward and crossed the iron bridge, the advance sections of the companies being led by Lieutenants Alexander and Wells, respectively. After ... a time the entire advance-guard, including the two Gatling guns, was concentrated on the right of the railroad. It dislodged the enemy, and with the cavalry troop to the right, the troop had arrived about this time, after doing effective service in threatening the enemy’s flank, and with the companies of Major Gilbraith pushed forward in the centre, took up a position on the northern line of hills. Here they were rejoined by the infantry and by two pieces of artillery under First Lieutenant Archibald Campbell, which the brigade commander had ordered forward, and which by their fire added to the discomfiture of the enemy. The two Gatling guns under Lieutenant Maginnis, with the advance, did good work, at first in a place near the creek where the gunners had a good view of the enemy, and later on at the various positions of the advance-guard. The two guns from the main body were also operated from the crest of the hill during the latter stage of the combat.

The affair ended about six o’clock; and the troops, including all the artillery, bivouacked on or near the position occupied by the enemy. The wagon train afterward went into park between the railroad and the Rio Grande, near enough to enable the men to get what was necessary for their comfort during the night. Before darkness set in, Captain Macomb with his troop was directed to make an effort to capture a railway train in plain sight from the hill occupied by the command; but the train got under way before he could reach it. It also escaped some shots that were fired at it by the artillery. Although it had now become quite dark, the captain picked up a few prisoners, including a wounded lieutenant.

The difficulty in locating the enemy, and hence in giving proper direction to the attack formations, has already been alluded to. Another cause of anxiety during the earlier stage of the fight were the reports that came to the brigade commander from different parts of the field, through officers, that the enemy was getting around our right (or left) flank, and endeavoring to capture our train. There may have been some foundation for these reports; but, if so, the flanking parties were probably small, and deterred from pursuing their design by our steady advance. It may be added that the train was well guarded.

Our loss embraced 1 enlisted man killed and 1 officer and 15 men wounded. All the wounded, the surgeons say, will recover. The enemy’s loss cannot be definitely ascertained, but it is estimated at 15 killed alone. It probably did not fall short of 50 in killed and wounded.

The command continued its march at an early hour the following morning, the advance-guard and the main body proceeding slowly and with great caution. This extra care was unnecessary. Those of the enemy’s forces that were held in reserve (some of them not far from the city) had fled precipitately as soon as they realized the extent of their defeat.

In connection with the foregoing report I consider the subjoined document as being of interest:

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MILITARY
EXPEDITION IN CAMP AT MAYAGUEZ,
PUERTO RICO, Au, 1898.

GENERAL ORDERS
N.

The brigadier-general commanding desires to convey to the officers and soldiers of his command his thanks for their excellent conduct in the engagement they had on the 10th instant, near the town of Hormigueros, with the Spanish forces in that vicinity. Concealed in a strong position, they poured a murderous fire into our troops about to go into camp after a fatiguing march. Had the disposition of the cavalry screen and of the advance-guard which latter included both infantry and artillery been less perfect, or had the command been deficient in discipline or other soldierly qualities, such an attack might have proved disastrous. As it was, it was promptly and gallantly repulsed, the repulse resulting in the enemy’s precipitate evacuation of the city of Mayaguez, though it had been placed in a state of defence.

The major-general commanding the army has been pleased to commend the troops for their gallant action on this occasion, a fact which it affords the brigade commander genuine satisfaction to announce.

By command of Brigadier-General Schwan.

GROTE HUTCHESON,

Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General.