Since the war, foreshadowed in these
pages, has come and finds public opinion in America
gravely shocked at a war it believes to be solely
due to certain phases of European militarism, the writer
is now persuaded to publish these articles, which
at least have the merit of having been written well
before the event, in the hope that they may furnish
a more useful point of view. For if one thing
is certain it is that European militarism is no more
the cause of this war than of any previous war.
Europe is not fighting to see who has the best army,
or to test mere military efficiency, but because certain
peoples wish certain things and are determined to
get and keep them by an appeal to force. If the
armies and fleets were small the war would have broken
out just the same, the parties and their claims, intentions,
and positions being what they are. To find the
causes of the war we must seek the motives of the
combatants, and if we would have a lasting peace the
foundations upon which to build it must be laid bare
by revealing those foundations on which the peace
was broken. To find the causes of the war we
should turn not to Blue Books or White Papers, giving
carefully selected statements of those responsible
for concealing from the public the true issues that
move nations to attack each other, but should seek
the unavowed aims of those nations themselves.
Once the motive is found it is not
hard to say who it is that broke the peace, whatever
the diplomats may put forward in lieu of the real
The war was, in truth, inevitable,
and was made inevitable years ago. It was not
brought about through the faults or temper of Sovereigns
or their diplomats, not because there were great armies
in Europe, but because certain Powers, and one Power
in particular, nourished ambitions and asserted claims
that involved not only ever increasing armaments but
insured ever increasing animosities. In these
cases peace, if permitted, would have dissipated the
ambitions and upset claims, so it was only a question
of time and opportunity when those whose aims required
war would find occasion to bring it about.
As Mr. Bernard Shaw put it, in a recent
letter to the press: “After having done
all in our power to render war inevitable it is no
use now to beg people not to make a disturbance, but
to come to London to be kindly but firmly spoken to
by Sir Edward Grey.”
To find the motive powerful enough
to have plunged all Europe into war in the short space
of a few hours, we must seek it, not in the pages
of a “white paper” covering a period of
only fifteen days (July 20th to August 4th, 1914),
but in the long anterior activities that led the great
Powers of Europe into definite commitments to each
other. For the purposes of this investigation
we can eliminate at once three of the actual combatants,
as being merely “accessories after the fact,”
viz.: Servia, Belgium and Japan, and
confine our study of the causes of the conflict to
the aims and motives of the five principal combatants.
For it is clear that in the quarrel between Servia
and Austria, Hungary is only a side issue of the larger
question that divides Europe into armed camps.
Were categoric proof sought of how small a part the
quarrel between Vienna and Belgrade played in the
larger tragedy, it can be found in the urgent insistence
of the Russian Government itself in the very beginning
of the diplomatic conversations that preceded the
outbreak of hostilities.
As early as the 24th of July, the
Russian Government sought to prevail upon Great Britain
to proclaim its complete solidarity with Russia and
France, and on the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg
pointing out that “direct British interests
in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country
would never be sanctioned by British public opinion,”
the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that
“we must not forget that the general European
question was involved, the Servian question being
but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could
not afford to efface herself from the problem now
at issue.” (Despatch of Sir G. Buchanan
to Sir E. Grey, 24th July, 1914).
Those problems involved far mightier
questions than the relations of Servia to Austria,
the neutrality of Belgium or the wish of Japan to
keep the peace of the East by seizing Kiao-Chau.
The neutrality never became a war
issue until long after war had been decided on and
had actually broken out; while Japan came into the
contest solely because Europe had obligingly provided
one, and because one European power preferred, for
its own ends, to strengthen an Asiatic race to seeing
a kindred white people it feared grow stronger in
Coming then to the five great combatants,
we can quickly reduce them to four. Austria-Hungary
and Germany in this war are indivisible. While
each may have varying aims on many points and ambitions
that, perhaps, widely diverge both have one common
bond, self-preservation, that binds them much more
closely together than mere formal “allies.”
In this war Austria fights of necessity as a Germanic
Power, although the challenge to her has been on the
ground of her Slav obligations and activities.
Germany is compelled to support Austria by a law of
necessity that a glance at the map of Europe explains.
Hence, for the purpose of the argument, we may put
the conflict as between the Germanic peoples of Central
Europe and those who have quarreled with them.
We thus arrive at the question, “why
should such strangely consorted allies as England,
Russia and France be at war with the German people?”
The answer is not to be found in the
White Book, or in any statement publicly put forward
by Great Britain, Russia or France.
But the answer must be found, if we
would find the causes of the war, and if we would
hope to erect any lasting peace on the ruins of this
To accept, as an explanation of the
war the statement that Germany has a highly trained
army she has not used for nearly half a century and
that her people are so obsessed with admiration for
it that they longed to test it on their neighbours,
is to accept as an explanation a stultifying contradiction.
It is of course much easier to put the blame on the
Kaiser. This line of thought is highly popular:
it accords, too, with a fine vulgar instinct.
The German people can be spared the
odium of responsibility for a war they clearly did
nothing to provoke, by representing them as the victims
of an autocracy, cased in mail and beyond their control.
We thus arrive at “the real crime against Germany,”
which explains everything but the thing it set out
to explain. It leaves unexplained the real crime
To explain the causes of the war we
must find the causes of the alliances of England,
France and Russia against Germany.
For the cause of the war is that alliance that
and nothing else. The defence of the Entente
Cordiale is that it is an innocent pact of friendship,
designed only to meet the threat of the Triple Alliance.
But the answer to that is that whereas the Triple Alliance
was formed thirty years ago, it has never declared
war on anyone, while the Triple Entente before
it is eight years old has involved Europe, America,
Africa, and Asia in a world conflict. We must
find the motive for England allying herself with France
and Russia in an admittedly anti-German “understanding”
if we would understand the causes of the present war
and why it is that many besides Bernard Shaw hold that
“after having done all in our power to render
war inevitable” it was idle for the British
Government to assume a death-bed solicitude for peace,
having already dug its grave and cast aside the shovel
for the gun. When that motive is apparent we shall
realise who it was preferred war to peace and how
impossible it is to hope for any certain peace ensuing
from the victory of those who ensured an appeal to
The Entente Cordiale, to begin
with, is unnatural. There is nothing in common
between the parties to it, save antagonism to someone
else. It is wrongly named. It is founded
not on predilections but on prejudices not
on affection but on animosity. To put it crudely
it is a bond of hate not of love. None of the
parties to it like or admire each other, or have consistent
aims, save one.
That satisfied, they will surely fall
out among themselves, and the greater the plunder
derived from their victory the more certain their
Great Britain, in her dealings with
most white people (not with all) is a democracy.
Russia in her dealings with all, is an autocracy.
Great Britain is democratic in her
government of herself and in her dealings with the
great white communities of Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, and South Africa. She is not democratic
in her dealings with subject races within the Empire the
Indians, notably, or the Irish. To the Indians
her rule is that of an absentee autocracy, differing
in speech, colour, religion and culture from those
submitted to it by force; to the Irish that of a resident
autocracy bent on eliminating the people governed
from residence in their own country, and replacing
them with cattle for British consumption.
In both instances Britain is notably
false to her professions of devotion to democratic
principles. Her affinity with Russia is found
then, not in the cases where her institutions are good,
but in those where they are bad.
An alliance founded on such grounds
of contact can only produce evil.
To such it gave birth in Persia, to
such it must give birth in the present war.
In Persia we saw it betray the principles
of democratic government, destroy an infant constitution
and disembowel the constitutionalists, whilst it divided
their country into “spheres of influence”
and to-day we see it harvesting with hands yet red
with the blood of Persian patriots the redder fruit
of the seed then sown.
The alliance with France, while more
natural than that with Russia if we regard Great Britain
as a democracy (by eliminating India, Egypt, Ireland)
had the same guilty end in view, and rests less on
affinity of aims than on affinity of antipathies.
The Entente Cordiale, the more
closely we inspect it, we find is based not on a cordial
regard of the parties to it for each other, but on
a cordial disregard all three participants share for
the party it is aimed against.
It will be said that Germany must
have done something to justify the resentment that
could bring about so strangely assorted a combination
against herself. What has been the crime of Germany
against the powers now assailing her? She has
doubtless committed many crimes, as have all the great
powers, but in what respect has she so grievously sinned
against Europe that the Czar, the Emperor of India,
the King of Great Britain and Ireland, the Mikado
and the President of the French Republic to
say nothing of those minor potentates who like Voltaire’s
minor prophets seem capable de tout should
now be pledged, by irrevocable pact, to her destruction
as a great power?
“German militarism,” the
reply that springs to the lips, is no more a threat
to civilisation than French or Russian militarism.
It was born, not of wars of aggression, but of wars
of defence and unification. Since it was welded
by blood and iron into the great human organism of
the last forty years it has not been employed beyond
the frontiers of Germany until last year.
Can the same be said of Russian militarism
or of French militarism or of British navalism?
We are told the things differ in quality.
The answer is what about the intent and the uses made.
German militarism has kept peace and has not emerged
beyond its own frontier until threatened with universal
attack. Russian militarism has waged wars abroad,
far beyond the confines of Russian territory; French
militarism, since it was overthrown at Sedan, has
carried fire and sword across all Northern Africa,
has penetrated from the Atlantic to the Nile, has raided
Tonquin, Siam, Madagascar, Morocco, while English navalism
in the last forty years has bombarded the coast lines,
battered the ports, and landed raiding parties throughout
Asia and Africa, to say nothing of the well nigh continuous
campaigns of annexation of the British army in India,
Burma, South Africa, Egypt, Tibet, or Afghanistan,
within the same period.
As to the quality of the materialism
of the great Continental Powers there is nothing to
prefer in the French and Russian systems to the German
system. Each involved enormous sacrifices on the
people sustaining it. We are asked, however,
to believe that French militarism is maintained by
a “democracy” and German militarism by
an “autocracy.” Without appealing
to the captive Queen of Madagascar for an opinion
on the authenticity of French democracy we may confine
the question to the elected representatives of the
In both cases the war credits are
voted by the legislative bodies responsible to French
and German opinion. The elected representatives
of Germany are as much the spokesman of the nation
as those of France, and the German Reichstag has sanctioned
every successive levy for the support of German armaments.
As to Russian militarism, it may be presumed no one
will go quite so far as to assert that the Russian
Duma is more truly representative of the Russian people
than the Parliament of the Federated peoples of Germany
The machines being then approximately
the same machines, we must seek the justification
for them in the uses to which they have been put.
For what does France, for what does
Russia maintain a great army? Why does Germany
call so many youthful Germans to the colours?
On what grounds of moral sanction does Great Britain
maintain a navy, whose cost far exceeds all the burdens
of German militarism?
Russia stretches across the entire
area of Central Asia and comprises much of the greater
part of Europe as well. In its own territory,
it is unassailable, and never has been invaded with
success. No power can plunder or weaken Russia
as long as she remains within her own borders.
Of all the great powers in Europe she is the one that
after England has the least need of a great army.
She cannot be assailed with success
at home, and she has no need to leave her own territories
in search of lands to colonize. Her population,
secure in its own vast numbers and vast resources has,
for all future needs of expansion the continent of
Siberia into which to overflow. Russia cannot
be threatened within Russia and has no need to go
outside Russia. A Russian army of 4,000,000 is
not necessary to self-defence. Its inspiration
can be due only to a policy of expansion at the cost
of others, and its aim to extend and to maintain existing
Russian frontiers. As I write it is engaged not
in a war of defence but in a war of invasion, and
is the instrument of a policy of avowed aggression.
Not the protection of the Slavs from
Austria, herself so largely a Slavic power and one
that does not need to learn the principles of good
government from Russia, but the incorporation of the
Slavs within the mightiest empire upon earth this
is the main reason why Russia maintains the mightiest
army upon earth. Its threat to Germany, as the
protector of Austria-Hungary, has been clear, and if
we would find the reason for German militarism we
shall find at least one half of it across the Russian
The huge machine of the French army,
its first line troops almost equal to Germany’s,
is not a thing of yesterday.
It was not German aggression founded
it although Germany felt it once at Jena.
Founded by kings of France, French militarism has flourished
under republic, empire, constitutional monarchy, and
empire again until to-day we find its greatest bloom
full blown under the mild breath of the third republic.
What is the purpose of this perfect machine?
Self-defence? From what attack? Germany has
had it in her power, again and again within the last
thirty years to attack France at a disadvantage, if
not even with impunity. Why has she refrained whose
hand restrained her? Not Russia’s not
England’s. During the Russo-Japanese war
or during the Boer war, France could have been assailed
with ease and her army broken to pieces. But German
militarism refrained from striking that blow.
The object of the great army France maintains is not
to be found in reasons of self-defence, but may be
found, like that of Russia in hopes of armed expansion.
Since the aim in both cases was the same, to wage a
war of aggression to be termed of “recovery”
in one case and “protection” in the other,
it was not surprising that Czar and President should
come together, and that the cause of the Slavs should
become identified with the cause of Strasburg.
To “protect” the Slavs
meant assailing Austria-Hungary (another way of attacking
Germany), and to “recover” Strasburg meant
a mes-alliance between democrat of France and
Cossack of the Don.
We come now to the third party to
die Entente, and it is now we begin to perceive how
it was that a cordial understanding with England rendered
a Russo-French attack upon Germany only a question
of time and opportunity. Until England appeared
upon the scene neither Russia nor France, nor both
combined, could summon up courage to strike the blow.
Willing to wound they were both afraid to strike.
It needed a third courage, a keener purpose and a
German militarism was too formidable
a factor in the life of 65,000,000 of the most capable
people in Europe to be lightly assailed even by France
and Russia combined. Russia needed money to perfect
the machinery of invasion, so sorely tried by the
disastrous failure to invade Korea and Manchuria.
France had the money to advance, but she still doubted
the ability of her stagnant population of 40,000,000
to face the growing magnitude of the great people
across the Rhine. It needed another guarantee and
England brought it.
From the day that Great Britain and
her mighty fleet joined the separated allies with
their mighty armies, the bond between them and the
circle round Germany grew taut. From that day
the counsels of the allies and their new found “friend”
thickened and quickened. The immovable “menace
across the Rhine” in one case had become the
active “menace across the North Sea” in
the other case.
The sin of German militarism was at
last out. It could take to the water as kindly
as to the land. As long as the war machine guaranteed
the inviolability of German territory it was no threat
to European peace, but when it assumed the task of
safe-guarding German rights at sea it became the enemy
of civilization. These trading people not content
with an army that kept French “revanche”
discreetly silent and Slav “unity” a dream
of the future presumed to have a sea-born commerce
that grew by leaps and bounds, and they dared to build
a navy to defend and even to extend it. Delenda
est Carthago! From that day the doom of “German
militarism” was sealed; and England, democratic
England, lay down with the Czar in the same bed to
which the French housewife had already transferred
her republican counterpane.
The duration of peace became only
a question of time, and the war of to-day only a question
of opportunity and pretext. Each of the parties
to the understanding had the same clear purpose to
serve, and while the aim to each was different the
end was the same. Germany’s power of defence
must be destroyed. That done each of the sleeping
partners to the unsigned compact would get the share
of the spoils, guarded by armed German manhood, he
To Russia, the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary
and the incorporation of the Slav elements in part
into her own vast empire, in part into a vassal and
subordinate Balkan Confederacy.
To France the restoration of Lorraine,
with Metz, and of Alsace with Strasburg and their
1,500,000 of German speaking Teutons to the French
To England, the destruction of German
sea-power and along with it the permanent crippling
of German competition in the markets of the world.
Incidentally German colonies would
disappear along with German shipping, and with both
gone a German navy would become a useless burden for
a nation of philosophers to maintain, so that the future
status of maritime efficiency in Europe could be left
to the power that polices the seas to equitably fix
for all mankind, as well as for the defeated rival.
Such an outline was the altruistic
scope of the unsigned agreement entered into by the
three parties of the Triple Entente; and it
only remained to get ready for the day when the matter
could be brought to issue. The murder of the
Archduke Ferdinand furnished Russia with the occasion,
since she felt that her armies were ready, the sword
sharpened, and the Entente sure and binding.
The mobilization by Russia was all
that France needed “to do that which might be
required of her by her interests.” (Reply of
the French Government to the German Ambassador at
Paris, August 1st, 1914.)
Had the neutrality of Belgium been
respected as completely as the neutrality of Holland,
England would have joined her “friends”
in the assault on Germany, as Sir Edward Grey was
forced to admit when the German Ambassador in vain
pressed him to state his own terms as the price of
The hour had struck. Russia was
sure of herself, and the rest followed automatically
since all had been provided for long before. The
French fleet was in the Mediterranean, as the result
of the military compact between France and England
signed, sealed and delivered in November, 1912, and
withheld from the cognizance of the British Parliament
until after war had been declared. The British
fleet had been mobilized early in July in anticipation
of Russia’s mobilization on land and
here again it is Sir Edward Grey who incidentally supplies
In his anxiety, while there was still
the fear that Russia might hold her hand, he telegraphed
to the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg on 27th
of July, requiring him to assure the Russian Foreign
Minister, that the British Fleet, “which is
concentrated, as it happens” would not
disperse from Portland.
That “as it happens” is
quite the most illuminating slip in the British White
Paper, and is best comprehended by those who know what
have been the secret orders of the British fleet since
1909, and what was the end in view when King George
reviewed it earlier in the month, and when His Majesty
so hurriedly summoned the unconstitutional “Home
Rule” conference at Buckingham Palace on 18th
of July. Nothing remained for the “friends”
but to so manoeuvre that Germany should be driven
to declare war, or see her frontiers crossed.
If she did the first, she became the “aggressor”;
if she waited to be attacked she incurred the peril
Such, in outline, are the causes and
steps that led to the outbreak of war. The writer
has seen those steps well and carefully laid, tested
and tried beforehand. Every rung of the scaling
ladder being raised for the storming of the German
defences on land and sea was planed and polished in
the British Foreign Office.
As Sir Edward Grey confessed three
years ago, he was “but the fly on the wheel.”
That wheel was the ever faster driven purpose of Great
Britain to destroy the growing sea-power and commerce
of Germany. The strain had reached the breaking
During the first six months of 1914,
German export trade almost equalled that of Great
Britain. Another year of peace, and it would
certainly have exceeded it, and for the first time
in the history of world trade Great Britain would
have been put in the second place. German exports
from January to June had swelled to the enormous total
of $1,045,000,000 as against the $1,075,000,000 of
Great Britain. A war against such figures could
not be maintained in the markets, it must be transferred
to the seas.
Day by day as the war proceeds, although
it is now only six weeks old, the pretences under
which it was begun are being discarded. England
fights not to defend the neutrality of Belgium, not
to destroy German militarism, but to retain, if need
be by involving the whole world in war, her supreme
and undisputed ownership of the seas.
This is the crime against Europe,
the crime against the world that, among other victims
the United States are invited to approve, in order
that to-morrow their own growing navy may be put into
a like posture with that of a defeated Germany.
With the Kiel Canal “handed
to Denmark,” as one of the fruits of British
victory, as Lord Charles Beresford yesterday magnanimously
suggested, how long may it be before the Panama Canal
shall be found to be “a threat to peace”
in the hands of those who constructed it?
A rival fleet in being, whether the
gunners be Teuton or Anglo-Saxon unless the Admiralty
controlling it is seated at Whitehall, will always
be an eyesore to the Mistress of the seas, in other
words, “a threat to the peace of the world.”
The war of armaments cannot be ended
by the disarming of the German people. To hand
Europe over to a triumphal alliance of Russian and
French militarism, while England controls the highways
and waterways of mankind by a fleet whose function
is “to dictate the maritime law of nations,”
will beget indeed a new Europe, but a Europe whose
acquiescence is due to fear and the continued pressure
of well-sustained force a Europe submitted
to the despotism of unnatural alliances designed to
arrest the laws of progress.
The laws of progress demand that efficiency
shall prevail. The crime of Germany has been
superior efficiency, not so much in the arts of war
as in the products of peace. If she go down to-day
before a combination of brute force and unscrupulous
intelligence her fall cannot be permanent. Germany
has within herself the forces that ensure revival,
and revival means recovery. Neither France nor
Russia nor both combined, can give to Europe what
Britain now designs to take from it by their help.
Whatever may be the result of this
war on the field of battle, to France indeed it can
bring only one end. For her there is no future
save that of a military empire. Her life blood
is dried up. This war will sweep away all power
of recuperation. She will remain impotent to
increase her race, sterile of new forces for good,
her young men’s blood gone to win the barren
fields of Alsace. Her one purpose in the new
Europe will be to hold a sword, not her own, over the
struggling form of a resurgent Germany in the interests
of another people. Let Germany lose 1,000,000
men in the fighting of to-day, she can recover them
in two years of peace. But to France the losses
of this war, whether she win or lose, cannot be made
good in a quarter of a century of child births.
Whatever comes to Russia, to England, France as a
great free power is gone. Her future function
will be to act in a subordinate capacity alone; supported
and encouraged by England she will be forced to keep
up a great army in order that the most capable people
of the continent, with a population no defeat can arrest,
shall not fill the place in Europe and in the world
they are called on surely to fill, and one that conflicts
only with British aims and appetites.
German expansion was no threat to
France. It was directed to other fields, chiefly
those of commerce. In order to keep it from those
fields England fanned the dying fires of French resentment
and strove by every agency to kindle a natural sentiment
into an active passion.
The historian of the future will record
that whatever the immediate fate of Germany may be,
the permanent victim was France.
The day England won her to an active
policy of vengeance against the victor of 1870, she
wooed her to abiding loss. Her true place in
Europe was one of friendship with Germany. But
that meant, inevitably, the discovery by Europe that
the chief barrier to European concord lay not in the
armies of the powers, but in the ring of hostile battleships
that constrained her peoples into armed camps.
European militarism rests on English
navalism. English navalism requires for its continued
existence a disunited Europe; and a Europe kept apart
is a Europe armed, anxious and watchful, bent on mutual
attack, its eyes fixed on the earth. Europe
must lift its eyes to the sea. There lies the
highway of the nations, the only road to freedom the
sole path to peace.
For the pent millions of Europe there
can be no peace, no laying aside of arms, no sincere
development of trade or culture while one people,
in Europe but not of Europe, immune themselves
from all attack, and sure that whatever suffering
they inflict on others can never be visited on their
own shores, have it in their power to foment strife
with impunity and to call up war from the ends of the
earth while they themselves enjoy the blessing of
England, the soul and brain of this
confederacy of war abroad remains at peace at home.
As I write these words a despatch from Sir Alfred
Sharpe, the correspondent of a London paper in France,
comes to hand. It should be placarded in every
Foreign Office of the world, in every temple of justice,
in every house of prayer.
“It is difficult for the people
in England to realize the condition of Northern France
at the present time. Although the papers are full
of accounts of desolation and destruction caused by
the German invasion, it is only by an actual experience
that a full realization of the horror comes.
To return to England after visiting the French war
zone is to come back to a land of perfect peace, where
everything is normal and where it is not easy to believe
we are almost within hearing distance of the cannonade
on the Aisne.”
(Sir Alfred Sharpe, to the Daily
Chronicle from the Front, September 2nd, 1914.)
It is this immunity from the horror
of war that makes all Englishmen jingoes. They
are never troubled by the consequences of belligerency.
Since it is only by “an actual experience that
the full realization of the horror comes.”
Until that horror strikes deep on English soil her
statesmen, her Ministers, her Members of Parliament,
her editors, will never sincerely love peace, but
will plan always to ensure war abroad, whenever British
need or ambition demands it.
Were England herself so placed that
responsibility for her acts could be enforced on her
own soil, among her own people, and on the head of
those who devise her policies, then we might talk of
arbitration treaties with hope, and sign compacts
of goodwill sure that they were indeed cordial understandings.
But as long as Great Britain retains
undisputed ownership of the chief factor that ensures
at will peace or war on others, there can be only
armaments in Europe, ill-will among men and war fever
in the blood of mankind.
British democracy loves freedom of
the sea in precisely the same spirit as imperial Rome
viewed the spectacle of Celtic freedom beyond the
outposts of the Roman legions; as Agricola phrased
it, something “to wear down and take possession
of so that freedom may be put out of sight.”
The names change but the spirit of
imperial exploitation, whether it call itself an empire
or a democracy, does not change.
Just as the Athenian Empire, in the
name of a democracy, sought to impose servitude at
sea on the Greek world, so the British Empire, in
the name of a democracy, seeks to encompass mankind
within the long walls of London.
The modern Sparta may be vanquished
by the imperial democrats assailing her from East
and West. But let the world be under no illusions.
If Germany go down to-day, vanquished
by a combination of Asiatic, African, American, Canadian
and European enemies, the gain will not be to the
world nor to the cause of peace.
The mistress of the seas will remain
to ensure new combinations of enmity to prohibit the
one league of concord that alone can bring freedom
and peace to the world. The cause that begot this
war will remain to beget new wars.
The next victim of universal sea-power
may not be on the ravaged fields of mid-Europe, but
mid the wasted coasts and bombarded seaports of the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
A permanent peace can only be laid
on a sure foundation. A sure foundation of peace
among men can only be found when mastery of the sea
by one people has been merged in freedom of the seas